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ENFORCING THE FOREIGN CORRUPTION PRACTICES ACT
IN CHINA
INTRODUCTION
To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the
silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history;
but, that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your
fist.
—President Barack Obama

This Perspective examines the efforts made by the U.S. Security Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to enforce
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) abroad, specifically within
mainland China. Concomitant with the globalization of commerce, China is
beginning to open its boarders to foreign investors. This raises concerns of
whether the SEC and DOJ are sufficiently equipped to detect FCPA violations
within mainland China.
The FCPA is a statute enacted to counter corruption in the global
economy.1 It was enacted in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 and it has
two core provisions: anti-bribery and accounting.3 The DOJ and SEC share
FCPA enforcement authority and work with other federal agencies and
enforcement partners to investigate and prosecute FCPA violations.4 The
objective of the FCPA is to prohibit foreign publicly traded companies in the
United States from making bribes to foreign officials in exchange for business
and “promote a fair playing field for U.S. companies doing business abroad.”5
Generally speaking, the DOJ has criminal FCPA enforcement authority
whereas the SEC has civil FCPA enforcement authority..6 The negative
consequences that arise out of international corporate bribery cannot be
understated. FCPA violations (1) impede economic growth; (2) undermine

1

CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T JUST. & ENF’T DIV., U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resourceguide.pdf [hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE].
2 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
3 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2.
4 Id. at 4.
5 Id.
6 Id.
THE
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democratic values; (3) threaten stability and security on a global level; (4)
restrict U.S. efforts to promote freedom and democracy; and (5) harm
business—as bribes can lead to distorted prices and honest businesses are
harmed.7
Due to the far-reaching negative impacts of FCPA violations, efforts to
enforce the FCPA in foreign countries are vital—particularly in China. In
2015, China’s economy, as measured by Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”), is
ranked second at $10,354,832, following only the U.S., which is ranked first at
$17,419,000.8 The FCPA is the sole enforcement provision put in place to
ensure multinational corporations doing business in the world’s two largest
economies are following anti-bribery, anti-competition regulations. Moreover,
according to the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”), which measures
175 countries on their level of public sector’s corrupt business practices, China
is ranked 100/175.9 The aforementioned factors, combined with enormous
cultural and political differences,10 makes China a difficult country to
implement and enforce the FCPA.
Part 1 of this Perspective will discuss the importance of the U.S.
establishing cooperative arrangements with China,11 especially between the
SEC and China’s own domestic securities regulatory commission, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”). Currently, the U.S. and China
do not have an enforcement cooperation arrangement, but they do have a

7

Id. at 2–3.
Gross Domestic Product 2014, WORLD BANK (Dec. 29, 2015), http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
download/GDP.pdf.
9 Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/
results (last visited Jan. 1, 2015) (“The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on
how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of
public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).”).
10 China has an authoritarian, single-party government whereas the U.S. is governed by democracy.
Accountability is a primary function of democracy. Access to information, records and similar documents is a
primary function of accountability. However, in China, information is often restricted from the general public.
Furthermore, local customs generally tolerance the exchange of things of value for business—this custom is
referred to as “guan xi” (关系) in Mandarin Chinese. For a discussion on a comparison between governance
systems of China and the U.S., see generally Dan Guttman, Song Yaqin & Li Haiming, United States
Government Contracting and China’s Shi Ye Dan Wei: Two Shadow Governments – Path Dependency from
Opposite Directions, or Mutual Learning?, 35 ASIA PAC. J. PUB. ADMIN. 1, 1–53 (2013) (comparing and
contrasting the U.S. and China’s government systems).
11 See infra note 14.
8
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technical assistance agreement,12 which is inefficient for meeting the goals of
the FCPA.
Part 2 of this Perspective will evaluate the U.S. and China’s respective
whistleblower programs,13 and how they should work together to better
encourage whistleblowers to report FCPA violations. For example, an effective
whistleblower bounty would encourage more employees within mainland
China to report potential FCPA violations. However, to do so, the SEC and
DOJ must raise domestic awareness of the whistleblower program and offer
guidance to U.S. whistleblower practitioners, whom specialize in
whistleblower claims to do the same.
PART I
The U.S. has been cracking down on its enforcement efforts of the antibribery provisions of the FCPA,14 but its stricter efforts have not yielded the
most effective results. For example, the U.S. has established an “enhanced
dialogue” agreement with the CSRC, however this arrangement is
insufficient.15 The efforts to create a better framework for dialogue between
the SEC and CSRC have failed because the enhanced dialogue agreement
merely called for joint efforts to better identify and discuss regulatory issues of
common concern.16 Instead, the U.S. should have entered into an enforcement
arrangement17 with China, which would have better facilitated the sharing of

12 U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FACT SHEET (2015), http://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_cooparrangements.shtml.
13 The whistleblower program describes the program in which the U.S. offers protection to informants
who come forward with information on a possible securities violation. The program provides protections
against retaliation and offers a possible bounty (10%–30%) for any fee imposed. This type of program
encourages insiders to step forward with information.
14 Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Wis. L. Rev. 573, 577 (2012) (stating
that the DOJ has taken aggressive, broad interpretations of the FCPA when searching for FCPA bribery
violations including broad definitions of “foreign officials” and “anything of value”). Between 2010–2015, the
SEC brought charges on eight different occasions against Multinational companies for allegedly violating the
FCPA. The most recent charge was against Bristol-Myers Squibb in 2015. Bristol-Myers Squibb settled for
$14 million. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMM’N.,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last modified Oct. 5, 2015).
15 In 2006, the SEC and the CSRC announced their commitment to create “enhanced dialogue” between
the two agencies for enforcement purposes. U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SEC AND CSRC ANNOUNCE TERMS OF
REFERENCE FOR ENHANCED DIALOGUE (2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-63.htm.
16 U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SEC AND CSRC ANNOUNCE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ENHANCED
DIALOGUE (2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-63.htm.
17 U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SEC’S COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH FOREIGN REGULATORS (2012),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_coopfactsheet.htm.
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information between the two regulatory agencies by increasing the amount of
physical documents—evidence—shared amongst the regulators regarding
transactions in bank and brokerage accounts.18 The enforcement arrangement
is more effective than the enhanced dialogue framework because the exchange
of evidence would provide the SEC with better grounds to conduct an
investigation on any alleged FCPA violation.
Enforcement arrangements also create more opportunities for regulators to
assist one another in investigations and prosecutions of FCPA violations.19 The
U.S. is currently involved in enforcement arrangements with twenty-one
nations—and China should be next.20 As China continues to reduce its
Negative List21 and expand its Free Trade Zone (“FTZ”) to include more
provinces,22 commerce between the U.S. and China will increase. As a result,
cooperation between the SEC and the CSRC should increase as well.
An enforcement arrangement is necessary for the U.S. to maximize its
FCPA enforcement efforts because it needs the CRSC’s assistance in getting
China-based entities to comply with its measures. For example, there have
been instances where China-based, publicly-traded entities have refused to
cooperate with the SEC involving investigations. In 2015, China’s Big Four
Accounting Networks23 refused to produce documents that were vital to the
SEC’s investigation of potential fraud.24 The SEC disciplined the firms,25 but
their reluctance to comply with SEC demands raised enormous concerns
regarding the SEC’s ability to enforce the FCPA in China. As stated by
Andrew Ceresney, Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, “. . .obtaining
an audit firm’s workpapers is critical to enforcement staff’s ability adequately
18

Id.
Id.
20 U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 11.
21 The Negative List is a list of certain business ventures, which China prohibits foreigners to undertake
within mainland China. Michael Martina, China Vows to Loosen Market Access ‘Negative List’, REUTERS
(Sept. 15, 2015) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-market-access-idUSKCN0RF1632015
0915.
22 In 2015, China has expanded the FTZ to include Tianjin, Guangdong, and Fujian. Previously,
Shanghai was the only FTZ. The FTZ has favorable business regulations for foreign investors.
23 The Big Four Accounting Networks include the following firms: (1) Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Certified Public Accountants Limited; (2) Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP; (3) KPMG Huazhen (Special
General Partnership); (4) and PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhong Tian CPAs Limited Company. U.S. SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N, SEC IMPOSES SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA-BASED MEMBERS OF BIG FOUR ACCOUNTING NETWORKS
FOR REFUSING TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS (2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-25.html.
24 Id.
25 China’s Big Four Accounting Networks are registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board; thus, subject to the sanctions, which the SEC may impose. Id.
19

TORRES GALLEYSFINAL

2016]

7/22/2016 10:55 AM

FOREIGN CORRUPTION PRACTICES ACT

2045

to protect investors from the dangers of accounting fraud.”26 Thus, in addition
to enlisting more support from the CRSC, it would serve the interests of the
SEC to increase the number of agents working within the SEC headquarters in
the enforcement division in Washington D.C.27 Ideally, the SEC enforcement
division should enlist agents trained in Mandarin Chinese and who have a
strong understanding of Chinese business customs. These agents would be able
to communicate with the CRSC regularly and assist the SEC with facilitating
cooperation with accounting firms. Furthermore, if the SEC enters into an
enforcement arrangement with the CRSC, thereby increasing the amount of
documents the SEC has access to, it will need ample Mandarin Chinese trained
agents to evaluate the evidence.
PART II
Whistleblowers are an essential element to discovering U.S. securities
violations abroad and keeping foreign corruption in check. Unfortunately,
encouraging foreign nationals in China to come forward with information has
been problematic for two reasons. First, many Chinese informants fear
retaliation from their employers. A U.S. court may refuse to enforce the Dodd
Frank anti-retaliation provisions to protect a foreign-national whistleblower,28
leaving them vulnerable to retaliation without recourse. Second, a Chinese
national whistleblower may not have access to adequate counsel and guidance
regarding their claims because Chinese attorneys may lack experience or
expertise with whistleblower lawsuits.29
To encourage more whistleblowing, federal district courts should offer
Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection to Chinese nationals who come forward
with information regarding FCPA violations. In theory, Chinese law provides
whistleblowers with similar protections that the U.S. does. However, in

26

Id.
See generally Division of Enforcement, Sec.gov, https://www.sec.gov/enforce (last visited Apr. 3,
2016) (explaining that “[t]he Commission's enforcement staff conducts investigations into possible violations
of the federal securities laws, and prosecutes the Commission's civil suits in the federal courts as well as its
administrative proceedings”).
28 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (providing various whistleblower protections, such as anti-retaliation
provisions).
29 Generally, whistleblowers contact a private attorney for guidance on how to get their case together.
For example, the attorney may advise the whistleblower whether there is a potential violation or possible
reward and which documents the whistleblower can lawfully extract in preparation of the claim.
27
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practice, the reported protection of whistleblowers within China is weak,30
with nearly 70% of whistleblowers reporting incidents of retaliation.31 Thus, It
is vital for the federal courts to extend jurisdiction over foreign Dodd Frank
anti-retaliation claims and offer foreigners protection.
The federal courts have denied jurisdiction because they refused
“‘extraterritorial’ enforcement of the Dodd Frank anti-retaliation
proscriptions.”32 As a consequence, the Chinese whistleblowers have had no
recourse after whistleblowing and being allegedly retaliated against.33 The
SEC has lobbied for the courts to exercise jurisdiction.34 However, the agency
faces the difficult task of establishing that the legislative intent of the DoddFrank anti-retaliation provision covers extraterritorial enforcement of the Dodd
Frank provisions. To accomplish this, the SEC must continue to lobby in order
to clarify that the anti-retaliation provisions are intended to have an
extraterritorial reach. This will ensure that Chinese nationals will be eligible
for protection, which will encourage Chinese national whistleblowers to come
forward. Uncovering corrupt business practices will benefit the U.S. because
FCPA violations have far reaching negative consequences that harm the
general public.
In order to provide more adequate guidance to potential Chinese national
whistleblowers, the SEC and DOJ should—at minimum—offer guidance in
Mandarin Chinese on the interface of their website. On the SEC website, for
example, the only direct link to file a complaint is in English. The DOJ’s
website, on the other hand, has an option to change the interface of the home
page to Spanish. Moreover, the SEC and DOJ should encourage practitioners
to follow Jason Coomer’s example, a small private practitioner located in

30

Wendy L. Wysong, Yu Bing & Charles-Henri Boeringer, Blowing the Whistle on Corruption in the
U.S. and China, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://corporatecomplianceinsights.com/
blowing-the-whistle-on-corruption-in-the-u-s-and-china/.
31 Id.
32 Reuben Guttman, Arbitrary Application of Law in a Global Economy, HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Sept.
11, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/217165-arbitrary-application-of-law-in-aglobal-economy.
33 See Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175 (2nd Cir. 2014) (“[T]he antiretaliation provision does
not apply extraterritorially.”).
34 U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf. The SEC
has filed Amicus Curiae Briefs encouraging the federal district courts to “defer to the SEC rule and to hold that
individuals are entitled to employment retaliation protection if they report information of a possible securities
violation. . .” Id. at 19.
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Texas, and make it easier for Chinese nationals to report corruption.35 Jason
Coomer’s firm offers a Chinese language version of its website,36 and has
reportedly received around twenty-five whistleblower reports directly from
Chinese informants in the past two years. Coomer is taking two cases forward
with the SEC that originated from the claims submitted to his website.37 The
SEC and DOJ should focus on raising awareness amongst private practitioners
and encourage them to take similar steps as Jason Coomer did. This would
certainty lead to more Chinese national whistleblowers coming forward, which
will assist the SEC and DOJ in enforcing the FCPA.
In today’s global economy, enforcing the FCPA abroad presents an array of
challenges. The SEC and DOJ must focus their efforts on improving the
facilitation of discovering potential violations. The SEC should establish an
enforcement arrangement with the CSRC, and hire agents that are fluent in the
language to best examine the exchanged physical evidence between the two
agencies. Lastly, encouraging Chinese whistleblowers to voluntarily report
potential violations is essential. The SEC and DOJ must ensure Chinese
whistleblowers protection under U.S. whistleblowers protection statutes, which
will further the overall goals of the FCPA. Moreover, the SEC and the DOJ
should continue to hold joint seminars with private practitioners and encourage
them to make it easier for Chinese nationals to submit their claims. The U.S.
should not accept Chinese local customs as the norms of doing business.38 The
U.S. has long taken a leading role in writing the laws of international
commerce, and now it is time to enforce them.
NICHOLAS TORRES

35

See generally Adam Jourdan, China’s New Breed of Whistleblowers Takes On Big Business, REUTERS
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption-whistleblower-idUSBREA3G29X2014
0417 (explaining how Jason has begun reaching out to potential whistleblowers in mainland China).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See generally infra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining that de minimis exchange of value is
generally tolerated in mainland China while doing business). These “de minimis” exchanges of value are a
violation of the FCPA because the FCPA states that any exchange of value for business is a violation. See
FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 1, at 10.
 Emory University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2017; Editing Member, Emory Corporate
Governance and Accountability Review; Competitor, National Transactional LawMeets Moot Court
Competition; B.A. Political Science, University of Buffalo. I would like to thank Reuben Guttman for advising
me regarding the U.S. Securities Exchange Commissions, and Nicole Fukuoka for her comments and edits,
which assisted me greatly.

